The Captain Nicolas VanWingerden Crew, B-29, China/Burma/India.
From June of 1944 through January of 1945,
four groups (sixteen squadrons) of B-29 bombers were deployed through airfields
built by tens of thousands of Chinese laborers in the area of Chengdu – at Guanghan,
Qionglai, Pengshan, and Xinjin. They
comprised the 58th Bombardment Wing of the new Twentieth Air Force. This was the strategic bombing air force
which implemented the dream of the air power pioneers such as General
Arnold.
The strategic plan for “Operation
Matterhorn,” approved at the Quebec and Cairo Conferences, was: gather a force of the new long-range Boeing
B-29s in India, advance loaded bombers to the bases near Chengdu where they
would refuel, and launch long distance raids against Japan. Histories of the operation emphasize
President Roosevelt’s personal commitment to opening a bombing campaign from
China against Japan. The Twentieth Air
Force was not placed under any of the CBI theatre commanders (Arnold knew
Stilwell and Chennault would try to use the B-29s to support their own
operations), but was rather was an autonomous command under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The supply problems were daunting. Ships with materiel, fuel, and personnel
traveled from the U.S. via lengthy and roundabout Atlantic or Pacific routes to
Karachi or Calcutta. Before any raid
from India to China to Japan could be mounted, fuel had to be transported to
the airfields near Chengdu. B-29s,
intended for bombing, flew preparatory missions that carried only fuel (seven
tons per mission) over the Hump to China.
It took six missions over the Hump to provide enough fuel for one
mission to Japan. There were losses of
aircraft and men on these supply missions, which also reduced the active
service life of the engines and airframes.
The first raid against Japan -- a 3200-mile
mission -- was conducted the night of June 14-15, 1944. The numbers testify to the difficulty of the
task. Ninety two aircraft left India,
but only 79 reached China. Seventy-five
aircraft took off, but only 68 reached the Chinese coast and only 47 attacked
the target, the Yawata Iron Works.
Fifteen aircraft bombed visually and 32 bombed by radar. Only one bomb hit the target. It was a harbinger of difficulties to come.
The XX Bomber Command continued to press
its attacks, including some missions against Japanese targets in Manchuria,
Taiwan, and China. Its effectiveness
increased with the assignment of Major General Curtis LeMay to the CBI and as
it adopted new procedures -- a different formation, lead crews to find and mark
targets, control of the bomb run by both bombardier and radar operator, and
different mixes of high-explosive and incendiary bombs. But so did the effectiveness of the Japanese defenses.
By the end of 1944 the Command had lost 147
bombers. It was evident that the attacks
against Japan mounted from Chengdu were too expensive in men, aircraft, and
material to continue. The last attack
from Chengdu -- against Japanese targets in Taiwan -- was conducted on January
15, 1945, and the bombers deployed to the Marianas Islands in February. There they joined the rest of the B-29 force
attacking Japan, first with high-level precision bombing tactics, later with
low-level attacks that ignited Japanese cities.
Major General Haywood Hansell, one of the
air power visionaries who commanded B-29s, judged Operation Matterhorn “not a
success” from the operational view. “You
just couldn’t supply B-29s over the Hump well enough to conduct a successful
bombing campaign.” In the Marianas
Islands, the bombing force could be easily supplied by sea across the Pacific,
now cleared of the Japanese by the island-hopping campaigns.
Hansell judged, however, that “from the
standpoint of strategic effect” it was “a tremendous success,” confirming the
principle of central strategic command of a bomber force rather than assignment
of the forces to local commanders.
Tactical innovations pioneered in China made the Command more deadly for
the remainder of the war. Many of the
obstacles to the successful strategic bombing by the B-29s were with aircraft
and engines; many of these problems were shaken out in India and China.
Post-war studies demonstrated that Japan
was defeated by the twin effects of the submarine campaign, which cut off its
supplies, and the strategic bombing campaign, which destroyed its industrial
capacity. Operation Matterhorn was part
of the latter.
Operation Matterhorn
(more information)
Back as far as 1942, Roosevelt wanted to strike Japan
directly with bombers, just as Germany was being by British and American
strategic bombers. The USAAC had recognized this need and had already initiated
programs for super heavy, very long-range bombers (the B-29 and B-32). However,
even these aerial wunderkind would not be able to hit Japan from across the
great distances of the Pacific.
A plan proposed by Chiang Kai-shek and Claire Chennault
involved using bases around Chengtu, China, being supplied over the hump
(Himalaya mountains) by air. Roosevelt pressed for this plan over the
objections of most of the USAAF staff. After a variety of delays in logistics,
B-29 production, and crew training, a sizable force of over 100 B-29s was sent
to India as the XXth bomber command. They flew missions staging through the airbases
near Chengtu for refueling. This did not work out as well as was hoped...
By late November 1944, the logistical nightmare that was the
effort required to keep a sustained bombing campaign against Japan from China
was deemed not worth the effort, especially since Saipan had been taken and was
a better base. The 58th Bombardment Wing's operations tapered off and it moved
to Tinian to join the XXIst Bomber Command.
Forces
US 20th Air Force
Bombers 4 groups operating from India B-29A
The B-29 had been originally been designed with the idea of
hemispheric defense in mind. The bombers would operate out of bases in the USA
and be able to hit any future enemy at long ranges to keep war well away from
America's shores. In 1940, the War Department's contingency plan was changed to
use 24 B-29/B-32 bomber groups to bomb Germany from bases in the United Kingdom
and North Africa in case of war. However, the B-29 was destined never to be
used against Germany.
Even before Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt had
been interested in providing assistance to the Chinese leader, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, so that he could retaliate against Japanese air attacks on
Chinese cities. Roosevelt had even proposed to transfer some USAAC B-17s to
China as early as December of 1940 so that they could be used to bomb Japanese
cities, but this plan had to be abandoned since there were barely enough B-17s
to meet American needs. China had to be satisfied with 100 fighter planes
instead.
Immediately following Pearl Harbor, the decision was made to
place emphasis on defeating the European members of the Axis first, after which
the Allies would turn their full attention to Japan. After the January 1943
Casablanca Conference, President Roosevelt decided to inform Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek that all possible aid would be sent to prevent Japan from taking over
all of China. In order to do this, Roosevelt wanted to send hundreds of heavy
bombers to China so that they could bring the Japanese homeland under attack.
Neither the B-17 nor the B-24 had the ranges to carry out such missions, and
only the B-29 could do the job.
Up until that time, there had only been vague proposals for
the mission of the B-29s. There had been some plans for B-29s to be used
against Germany, with groups of B-29s to be stationed in Northern Ireland and
in Egypt, but no bases had actually been constructed. Chiang wanted the B-29s
sent to China right away so that they could begin an air offensive against
Japan. Both General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire L. Chennault were
supportive of this proposal, and exerted considerable pressure on the President
to initiate such a plan.
However, since the Japanese had cut off the Burma Road and
Lido Road overland routes to China, the effort would have to be supported
entirely by air. General George C. Marshall was fully aware of the enormous
supply problems involved in such an effort, and was wary about diverting effort
from the European theater, since the decision had already been made to win the
war in Europe before diverting full effort against Japan. Nevertheless,
President Roosevelt was insistent on getting help to Chiang, and suggested
sending up to 300 US bombers to China.
Things became more definitive after the August 1943 Quadrant
Conference in Quebec. At that time, General Henry H. Arnold submitted a plan
under which the newly-activated 58th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) would be
stationed in the CBI Theatre by the end of 1943 and begin attacking Japanese
targets by flying out of bases in China. It would be commanded by General
Kenneth B. Wolfe and would consist of four groups of B-29s. It was envisaged
that once sufficient numbers of B-29s were available, Japan could be forced out
of the war within six months by the destruction of her war industries, making a
costly seaborne invasion of the home islands unnecessary. It was projected that
such a program could defeat Japan by mid-1945.
The special B-29 project under the command of General Wolfe
was given top priority in both men and materials, second only to the secret
Manhattan Project. General Wolfe chose Colonel Harman as his deputy and General
LaVerne Saunders was assigned as director of the B-29 crew training program.
According to Arnold's original plan, the B-29s would be
stationed permanently in China, at bases around Chengtu in the south-center of
the country. Supplies of fuel, ammunition, bombs and spares would be flown in
from India over the Hump. Although both the Joint Plans Committee and the Joint
Logistics Committee had rejected Arnold's plan as being strategically
infeasible, President Roosevelt was highly enthusiastic about the idea and
passed it along to Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who was Chiang Kai-shek's Chief
of Staff. General Stilwell pointed out that it would be impractical to carry out
all of the B-29 operations from China because of the length of the supply
lines, and suggested instead that the B-29s be maintained at bases in eastern
India, and only staged through Chengtu in the process or aftermath of the raids
on Japan. This plan had the advantage in that a complex base facility would not
be needed in China, and the supply problem would be simplified if the B-29s
themselves could be used to carry some of the bombs and fuel needed to build up
the dumps at Chengtu.
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still skeptical
about the idea, President Roosevelt was still insistent, and since FDR was the
Commander-in-Chief, they had to go along.
The British were brought into the plan, and on November 10
they agreed to provide bases for B-29 operations around Calcutta. At the same
time, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to begin construction of five new airbases around
Chengtu.
On June 1, 1943, the first Superfortress unit -- the 58th
Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) had been activated at Marietta, Georgia, near
Bell's Superfortress plant. On September 15, 1943, the headquarters of the 58th
BW was moved to Salina, Kansas, with some of its groups near the Wichita
factory. The first Superfortress wing initially had 5 groups (the 40th, 444th,
462nd, 468th and 472nd Bombardment Groups). The 472nd BG was destined to remain
at Smoky Hill Field, Salina as an operational training unit, and the others
were to be deployed to India.
President Roosevelt wanted the B-29 bombing raids against
Japan to start by January 1944. However, delays in the B-29 program forced
General Arnold to admit to the President that the bombing campaign against
Japan could not begin until May 1944 at the earliest. The crews of the B-29
needed a degree of specialist training that was not required for crews of
other, less complex aircraft. It usually took 27 weeks to train a pilot, 15 to
train a navigator, and 12 to train a gunner. The complexity of the B-29 was
such that a lengthy process of crew integration had to take place before combat
deployment could begin. By the end of December 1943, only 73 pilots had
qualified for the B-29 and very few crews had been brought together as a
complete team.
Although a total of 97 B-29s had been produced by the
beginning of 1944, only 16 of them were really airworthy. Most of the others
were in AAF modification centers, located near the Bell-Marietta and
Martin-Omaha plants and at air bases in Kansas, undergoing a series of
modifications and changes necessitated by the lessons of air combat over
Europe. At that time, much of the equipment and components of the Superfortress
had still not been perfected, and rather than delay production by stopping the
assembly lines to incorporate modifications and add new equipment, it was
decided to let the first production airplanes leave the lines at Wichita
deficient in combat readiness and deliver them to these USAAF modification
centers to bring them up to combat standards.
Engine fires were still plaguing the B-29 program. Some of
these problems were solved by the replacement of the original R-3350-13 engines
by R-3350-21 engines which did not really reduce the incidence of engine fires
but at least reduced the risk of engine fires spreading to the aluminum-covered
wings. The R-3350-23 was developed, but it was not ready in time to be fitted
to the aircraft as they rolled off the production line, so they had to be
fitted at the modification centers.
In addition, the AN/APQ-13 bombing-navigational aid intended
for the B-29 was a complex piece of equipment and was vulnerable to dirt and
vibration and had to be carefully checked. Special schools had to be set up at
Harvard, MIT and Boca Raton, Florida to train crews to operate the new radar
set.
Alarmed at the slow pace of bringing adequate numbers of
Superfortresses into service, on November 27, 1943, General Arnold set up a new
organization to take responsibility for the overall control of the
Superfortress units. This was to be the XX Bomber Command, to be commanded by
General Wolfe. The XX Bomber Command would consist of the 58th Bombardment Wing
(the command of which was transferred from Wolfe to his deputy, Col. Leonard
(Jake) Harmon). The 58th BW was to initially be comprised of five groups (40th,
444th, 462nd, 468th and 472nd Bombardment Groups).
At the same time, a new
wing, the 73rd, to be commanded by Colonel Thomas H. Chapman, was added to the
XX Bomber Command with four more groups to absorb the second batch of 150
Superfortresses.
Headquarters were set up close to the B-29 factory at
Wichita, Kansas. Responsibility for crew training was assigned to Col. LaVerne
G. Saunders of the Second Air Force. Four airfields in Kansas (Smoky Hill,
Pratt, Great Bend and Walker) were to handle this task.
The crew training program was one of the more difficult
aspects of the entire B-29 program. Because of the complexity of the B-29
aircraft, a lengthy process of crew integration was required before combat
operations could begin. There was no time to start from scratch, so volunteers
were called for from B-24 crews returning from operations in Europe and North
Africa. Crews began to arrive at Kansas bases in November 1943, but very few
bombers were ready to receive them. At that time, there was only one
Superfortress for every twelve crews, and most crews had to train on Martin B-26
Marauders or Boeing B-17 Fortresses. By the end of December, only 67 pilots had
managed to fly a B-29 and very few crews had been brought together as a
complete team. Many gunners did not even see their first B-29 until early 1944.
It was not until December of 1943 that the decision not to
use the B-29 against Germany was finally made, and to concentrate the B-29
exclusively against Japan. However, in early 1944, the B-29s were still not
ready to begin Roosevelt's promised offensive against Japan. Most of the B-29s
were still held up at the modification centers, awaiting conversion to full
combat readiness. By March of 1944, the B-29 modification program had fallen
into complete chaos, with absolutely no bombers being considered as combat
ready. The program was seriously hampered by the need to work in the open air
in inclement weather, by delays in acquiring the necessary tools and support
equipment, and by the USAAF's general lack of experience with the B-29.
General Arnold became alarmed at the situation and directed
that his assistant, Major General B.E. Meyer, personally take charge of the
entire modification program. The resulting burst of activity that took place
between March 10 and April 15, 1944 came to be known as the "Battle of
Kansas". Beginning in mid-March, technicians and specialists from the
Wichita and Seattle factories were drafted into the modification centers to
work around the clock to get the B-29s ready for combat. The mechanics often
had to work outdoors in freezing weather, since the hangars were not large
enough to accommodate the B-29s. As a result of superhuman efforts on the part
of all concerned, 150 B-29s had been handed over to the 20th Bomber Command by
April 15, 1944.
General Wolfe assigned the first B-29s to squadrons within
the 58th Bombardment Wing and despached them immediately to India. This was a
11,530-mile journey, involving stops at Marrakech, Cairo, Karachi and Calcutta.
One B-29 passed through England in March of 1944 in an attempt to confuse Axis
intelligence about the intended theatre of action of the B-29, although the
B-29 was never intended for use in the European theatre. Apparently neither the
Germans nor the Japanese were fooled by this ploy, since the Japanese were long
aware that Superfortresses were going to be based in India and staged through
bases in China in an attempt to attack targets on the home islands.
The headquarters of the XX Bomber Command had been
established at Kharagpur, India on March 28, 1944 under the command of General
Wolfe. The first B-29 reached its base in India on April 2, 1944. In India,
existing airfields at Kharagpur, Chakulia, Piardoba and Dudkhundi had been
converted for B-29 use. All of these bases were located in southern Bengal and
were not far from port facilities at Calcutta. All of these bases had
originally been established in 1942-43 for B-24 Liberators. The conditions at
these bases were poor, and the runways were still in the process of being
lengthened when the first B-29s arrived. The headquarters of the 58th BW,
together with the four squadrons of the 40th Bombardment Group (the 25th, 44th,
45th and 395th) were assigned to an airfield at Chakulia, the first planes
arriving there on April 2, 1944. The headquarters was moved to Kharagpur on
April 23. The 444th Bombardment Group (676th, 677th, 678th and 679th Squadrons)
went to Charra, arriving there on April 11. The 462nd Bombardment Group (768th,
769th, 770th and 771st squadrons) to Piardoba, arriving there on April 7. The
468th Bombardment Group (792nd, 793rd, 794th and 795th Squadrons) arrived at
Kharagpur on April 13. The 444th Bombardment Group later moved to a permanent base
at Dudhkundi, leaving Charra to become a transport base for the C-87s and C-46s
which would support the effort.
On April 4, 1944, a special strategic command was
established, to be known as the 20th Air Force, which would carry out the
aerial assault against Japan. This was done at the insistence of General Arnold
himself, mainly to avoid having the B-29s being diverted to tactical missions
under pressure from CBI Theatre commanders such as Major General Claire L.
Chennault or General Joseph Stilwell. The 20th Air Force would be commanded by
General Arnold himself at JCS level. The 20th Air Force would be completely
autonomous and their B-29s would be completely independent of other command
structures and would be dedicated exclusively against strategic targets in
Japan. For the first time, the B-29 offensive against Japan was given a name --
Operation Matterhorn. On April 10, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
informally approved Operation Matterhorn. The operational vehicle was to be the
58th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) of the XX Bomber Command.
Before deployment from America, Saunders had taken over
command of the 58th Bombardment Wing from Harmon.
During the week of April 15-22, no less than five B-29s
crashed near Karachi (a stop on the route to Calcutta), all from overheated
engines. The entire B-29 fleet had to be grounded en route until the cause was
found. The cause was traced to the fact that the R-3350 engine had not been
designed to operate at ground temperatures higher than 115 degrees Fahrenheit,
which were typically exceeded in Karachi. Wright engineers found that the
exhaust valves on the rear row of cylinders were melting under the heat and
pressure, and they designed new engine baffles to direct cooling air onto the
affected areas. They also improved the flow of oil to the rear cylinders by
installing crossover oil tubes from the intake to the exhaust port of the five
top cylinders on both the front and rear rows.
Modifications had also to be
made to the cowl flaps. After these modifications, B-29 flights to India were
resumed.
By May 8, 1944, 130 B-29s had reached their bases in India.
For the next month, the four groups flew a total of 2,867 hours of which 2,378
(83%) were on transport service, 50 on miscellaneous jobs, and only 439 in
training activities, giving an average of less than 2 hours each for the 240
crews on hand.
There were four sites in the Chengtu area of China that were
assigned to the B-29 operation -- at Kwanghan, Kuinglai, Hsinching and
Pengshan. Construction work at these bases had begun as early as November 1943,
but progress had been slow since much of the work had be done by hand. However,
by May enough progress had been made that the four bases could actually be
used, but the conditions were far from ideal.
The primary flaw in the Operation Matterhorn plan was the
fact that all the suplies of fuel, bombs and spares needed to support the
forward bases in China had to be flown in from India over the Hump, since
Japanese control of the seas around the Chinese coast made seaborne supply of
China impossible. Plans were made to use transport adaptations of the B-24
Liberator (known as the C-87) in support of the operation, and to even convert
Liberators into special fuel transports under the designation C-109. Many of
the supplies had to be delivered to China by the B-29s themselves. For this
role, they were stripped of nearly all combat equipment and used as flying
tankers and each carried seven tons of fuel. The Hump route was so dangerous
and difficult that each time a B-29 flew from India to China it was counted as
a combat mission, calling for the painting of a camel on the aircraft's nose.
By May 8, 1944, 148 B-29s had reached Marrakech and 230 were
in India. The four bombardment groups of the 58th Bombardment Wing were
assigned to their bases.
The first action by the B-29 took place on April 26, 1944.
Major Charles Hansen was flying a load of fuel to China when his plane was
attacked by six Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters. The attack was beaten off, but one
crew member was injured.
The first B-29 bombing raid took place on June 5, 1944. Led
by General Saunders himself, 98 B-29s took off from bases in eastern India to
attack the Makasan railroad yards at Bangkok, Thailand. This involved a
2261-mile round trip, the longest bombing mission yet attempted during the war.
The engines of the B-29 were still causing problems, and fourteen B-29s were
forced to abort because of engine failures. The target was obscured by bad
weather, necessitating bombing by radar. The formations became confused and
dropped their bombs at altitudes between 17-27,000 feet rather than the planned
22-25,000 feet. Only eighteen bombs landed in the target area. Five B-29s
crashed upon landing after the mission and 42 were forced to divert to other airfields
because of a shortage of fuel.
The B-29 campaign was off to a bad start,
although none of the bombers were actually lost to enemy action.
On June 6, General Wolfe received an urgent message from
Washington complaining that the JCS were getting impatient and that they wanted
an immediate attack on Japan proper. This attack was needed to relieve pressure
from Japanese forces in eastern China where General Claire Chennault's
Fourteenth Air Force airfields were under attack and to assist an "important
operation" in the Pacific which was later revealed to be the invasion of
Saipan. General Wolfe was caught flatfooted by this order and attempted to
delay the mission until late June when he would have a larger force and more
supplies in place at the forward bases in China. However, Washington demanded
that he put a minimum of 70 B-29s over Japan by June 15. One of the problems
was that only 86 B-29s could be equipped with the bomb-bay tanks needed for the
long flight to Japan and, based upon previous experience, more than 20 of them
would fail to leave the base in China while others would fail to bomb the
target. But when your superiors give the orders, you do as you are told.
By mid-June, enough supplies had been stockpiled at Chinese
forward bases to permit the launching of a single sortie against targets in
Japan. It was a nighttime raid to be carried out on the night of June 14/15,
1944 against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata on Kyushu. This plant
was considered to be the most important single objective within Japan's steel
industry, and had long held top priority for the first strike. Intelligence
estimated Imperial's annual production at 2.25 million metric tons of rolled
steel -- 24% of Japan's total. The secondary target was Laoyao harbor, an
outlet for much coking coal, manganese and phosphates. Because of the long
distance (3,200 miles), Washington had ordered a night mission with planes
bombing individually. Bombing was to be done from two levels, 8,000 to 10,000
feet and 14,000 to 18,000 feet. Two pathfinder aircraft from each group were to
light off the target. Takeoff was scheduled for 1630 local time, June 15, 1944,
permitting the aircraft to arrive over the target during darkness.
Staging at the forward bases in China began on June 13, 1944
and was completed shortly before H-hour on June 15. The B-29s had left India
fully loaded with bombs, requiring only refueling at the forward bases in
China. Each plane carried two tons of 500-pound general purpose bombs,
considered powerful enough to disrupt the fragile coke ovens by either a direct
hit or by blast. Of the 92 aircraft leaving India, only 79 had actually reached
China, with one plane crashing en route. The staging bases were:
• Hsinching
for the 40th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
• Kwanghan
for the 444th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
• Chiung-Lai
for the 462d Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
• Pengshan
for the 468th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
Takeoffs from the forward bases in China began early in the
evening (1616) and two groups approximated the schedule of two-minute intervals
between takeoffs. The other two groups were slow in getting their aircraft
airborne.
Of the 75 B-29s dispatched, one crashed and four were forced
to return to base due to mechanical problems. At 2338 (China time) the first
B-29 over the target gave the signal "Betty," indicating "bombs
away with less than 5/10 cloud." Of the 68 aircraft that had left China,
only 47 attacked the intented target. One B-29 crashed in China (cause unknown),
6 jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, 2 bombed the
secondary target and 5 bombed targets of opportunity.
Unfortunately, the Japanese had been warned of the
approaching raid and the city of Yawata was blacked out and haze and/or smoke
helped to obscure the target. Only 15 aircraft bombed visually while 32 bombed
by radar. Only one bomb actually hit anywhere near the intended target. This
was a bomb which had hit a power house some 3700 feet from the coke ovens. Some
damage had been done to the Kokura Arsenal, to miscellaneous industrial
buildings, and to business-industrial areas. The steel industry was essentially
untouched. One B-29 was lost to enemy fire and six were lost in various
accidents.
Although very little damage was actually done, the Yawata
raid was hailed as a great victory in the American press, since it was the
first time since the Doolittle raid of 1942 that American aircraft had hit the
Japanese home islands.
General Wolfe was ordered to keep up the attacks even in
spite of a shortage of fuel and bombs at the Chengtu bases. He told his
superiors that it was impossible to stage any more raids on Japan at the
present time. Washington had to blame someone for the lack of progress, and
General Wolfe was the most likely candidate. On July 4, the General was
recalled to Washington, promoted and reassigned. He was replaced on a temporary
basis by Brig. Gen. LaVerne G. Saunders until a permanent commander could be
found.
On July 7, while under temporary command of General
Saunders, eighteen B-29s attacked targets at Sasebo, Nagasaki, Omura and Yawata
with ineffective results. On July 9, 72 B-29s hit a steel-making complex at
Anshan in Manchuria. Of the 72 aircraft launched against Anshan, one crashed on
takeoff and eleven suffered mechanical failures en route to Manchuria and had
to abort. Four aircraft were lost and results were poor. On the night August
10/11, 56 B-29s staged through British air bases in Ceylon (now known as Sri
Lanka) attacked the Plajdoe oil storage facilities at Palembang on Sumatra in
present-day Indonesia. This involved a 4030-mile, 19 hour mission from Ceylon
to Sumatra, the longest American air raid of the war. Other B-29s laid mines in
the Moesi River. At the same time, a third batch of B-29s attacked targets in Nagasaki.
These raids all showed a lack of operational control and inadequate combat
techniques, drifting from target to target without a central plan and were
largely ineffective.
Many of the accidents which plagued the B-29s operating out
of China and India were caused by engine fires, which were still a problem in
spite of massive efforts to correct them. The cylinder head temperature gauges
were red-lined at 270 degrees Celsius. The combination of very high ambient
ground temperatures (100 to 115 degrees Fahrenheit) and the inadequate cooling
system of the engines would often result in head temperatures exceeding 310
during and immediately after takeoff. The high temperatures often resulted in
the evaporation of valve stem lubrication, which could cause the valve to break
off. The broken valve would then blow the cylinder off, which inevitably
resulted in a fire.
Crews soon learned that the key to keeping the engine head
temperature within tolerable limits was to have as much airspeed as possible
when they became airborne on takeoff. During takeoff, they used the entire
runway and reached a speed of 140-145 mph to become airborne in a fairly
nose-low attitude. After takeoff, they would stay fairly low for a rather long
time, with no effort to climb. This was done to attain the climbing speed of
200 mph as rapidly as possible. As the airspeed built up, the flight engineer
would start to squeeze the large cowl flaps closed, since the key to
controlling the head temperatures was airspeed, and as the speed got higher,
cowling flaps in the extended position produced more drag than cooling.
General Wolfe's replacement was Major General Curtis E.
LeMay, who arrived in India on August 29. General LeMay was only 38 years old
and was the youngest major general in the Army. He had earned a good reputation
as commander of a B-17 air division in Europe. He was known as a tough,
Patton-type of commander and had a "take-charge" reputation. As a
start, he stepped up the frequency of B-29 missions and intensified the training
of combat crews. He replaced the four-plane diamond formation with one of
twelve aircraft grouped in a defensive box. He introduced the concept of lead
crews who would be responsible for finding and marking the target. In the
future, both the bombardier and radar operator would control the bombing run,
so that whoever had sight of the target at the critical moment in the bomb run
could release the bombs. At the same time, the 58th Bombardment Wing was
reorganized, and the junior squadron from each group (the 395th, 679th, 771st
and 795th) was disbanded. This left each group with three squadrons of ten
B-29s each.
It took a while for these changes to have an effect. Another
raid against Anshan in Manchuria on September 26 was inclusive. An attack on
October 25 on the Omura aircraft factory on Kyushu showed better results,
particularly in the decision to use a two-to-one mixture of high-explosive and
incendiary bombs. A raid was carried out on November 11 against the Chinese
city of Nanking, which had been occupied by the Japanese since 1937. Supply
problems and aircraft accidents were still preventing a fully effective
concentration of force and effort. In addition, Japanese defensive efforts were
becoming more effective. On November 21, six B-29s were destroyed by Japanese
aircraft during a raid on Omura. A similar loss rate occurred on December 7
over the Manchurian Aircraft Company plant at Mukden. B-29 losses to accidents,
enemy interception, and to Japanese air attacks on the Chengtu forward bases
soon came to be prohibitive, and by the end of 1944 had reached 147.
LeMay gradually cut back on the number of missions flown out
of the Chinese bases in favor of missions to Singapore, Borneo, Malaya and
Sumatra that could be flown from the bases in India where the supply situation
was much more favorable.
By late 1944, it was becoming apparent that B-29 operations
against Japan staged out of bases in Chengtu were far too expensive in men and
materials and would have to be stopped. In December of 1944, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff made the decision that Operation Matterhorn would be phased out, and
the 58th Bombardment Wing's B-29s would be moved to newly-captured bases in the
Marianas in the central Pacific.
The last raid out of China was flown on January 15, 1945,
which was an attack on targets in Formosa. The 58th Bombardment Wing then
withdrew to its bases in India and was redeployed to the Marianas in February.
During Operation Matterhorn, 49 separate missions had been
flown involving 3058 individual aircraft sorties. Only 11,477 tons of bombs had
been dropped. In spite of the massive effort involved in Operation Matterhorn,
only insignificant damage had been done to targets in Japan.
In retrospect, Operation Matterhorn had been a failure. The
supply problems proved to be insoluble, and the Chengtu bases in China were too
far west, requiring long overflights of Japanese-occupied territory in China
before the Japanese home islands could be reached. Even then, only the
southernmost Japanese island of Kyushu was in range of the B-29s. Nevertheless,
the Matterhorn operation provided valuable experience for the B-29 operations
that were to be mounted from the far more convenient bases in the Marianas.
Order of Battle of XX Bombardment Command:
58th Bombardment Wing
- activated June 1944
40th Bombardment
Group
25th, 44th, 45th, 395th Bombardment Squadrons, 395th
deactivated September-October 1944.
444th Bombardment
Group
676th, 677th, 678th, 679th Bombardment Squadrons, 679th
deactivated September-October 1944.
462nd Bombardment
Group
768th, 769th, 770th, 771st Bombardment Squadrons, 771st
deactivated September-October 1944.
468th Bombardment
Group
792nd, 793rd, 794th, 795th Bombardment Squadrons, 795th
deactivated September-October 1944.
#
The initial plan of use, implemented according to the
guidelines of the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, resulting in promises
made to China and calls Operation Matterhorn, was to use the B-29 to attack
Japan and other objectives as needed, starting from four forward bases in
Guangxi, the southern region of China and five airports, to be used as main
bases, in India, in the region of the current Bangladesh.
The region of Chengdu was finally preferred to that of
Guilin to avoid having to train 50 Chinese divisions to protect the bases
against attacks terrestrial Japanese.
This project was extremely expensive, because there were no
land links between India and China and all materials necessary for the
operation of the forward bases had to be transported by air passing over the
Himalayas through transport aircraft, or with the same B-29, using some
specimens which were taken off the guards and weapons to turn them into
aircraft for the transport of fuel.
The B-29 began to arrive in India in early April 1944.
The first flight of B-29 transfer from airports in China
over the Himalayas, bypassing the so-called The Hump, took place April 24,
1944.
The first combat mission of the B-29 was launched June 5,
1944: 77 of the 98 B-29 departed from bases in India and were sent to bomb the
railway workshops in Bangkok in Thailand.
Five B-29s were lost due to technical problems.
On June 15, 1944, 68 B-29 took off from bases in Chengdu in
China and 47 aircraft reached and bombed the imperial Yawata steelworks in
Japan.
This was the first bombing raid on the Japanese islands from
Doolittle in April 1942.
In this mission, we were the first combat casualties of
B-29, with one aircraft destroyed on the ground by Japanese fighters after an
emergency landing in China, one lost because of anti-aircraft fire on Yawata,
and another plane, the Stockett's Rocket (named after Captain Marvin M.
Stockett, the commander of the aircraft) disappeared after takeoff from
Chakulia in India.
The raid caused little damage to the lens, with a bomb that
struck installations and practically ran out of fuel reserves of the bases of
Chengdu, causing slow operations until stocks were not replenished.
Against the B-29 was also adopted by the Japanese tactic of
launching intentionally with fighter bombers trying collision.
The first example of this technique was recorded during the
raid of August 20 against the steel mills of Yawata.
Sergeant Shigeo Nobe the 4th Sentai intentionally flew with
his Kawasaki Ki-45 against a B-29; scrap projected by the explosion, severely
damaged another B-29 that crashed.
The two US losses were the B-29 freshman B-29-10-BW 42-6334
Gertrude C with commander Colonel Robert Clinksale and the B-29 freshman
B-29-15-BW 42-6368 Calamity Sue with Commander Captain Ornell Stauffer, both of
the 486th BG.
Many of these aircraft were destroyed in such attacks in the
following months.
Although the term "Kamikaze" is used to identify
this type of attack, the word is not used by the Japanese historiography
distinguishes between suicide attacks to ships and combat aircraft of this
type, not necessarily suicide.
The B-29 were withdrawn from the airports in China towards
the end of January 1945.
In the period of use of these aircraft departing from China
and India, were conducted missions against many targets across South East Asia,
but it was decided the gradual transfer of the entire fleet to new bases in the
Mariana Islands.
The last mission departing from India, was launched March
29, 1945.
In addition to the logistical problems associated with
operations starting from China, the B-29 could reach only a limited part of
Japan, starting from those bases.
The solution to this problem was the conquest of the Mariana
Islands that would bring goals as Tokyo, 2400 kilometers away, within the
"Superfortress".
It was therefore decided in December 1943 to win the
Marianas.
The Marianas operation was starting to go the same way as
Operation Matterhorn, with losses being high and not much damage to the enemy
being done. Hansell strove to improve the skill of his bombardiers and lead
crews, who seemed to be far too eager to resort to radar when conditions were
unfavourable. However, it could be said that they did have good reason - one
hindrance to bombing was restricted vision through iced-up windows,
necessitating new heating devices.
Though dissatisfied with the early performance of his
Command, Hansell seems to have considered this as an experimental period. Not
so Arnold, who was no doubt apprehensive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff view if
the expensive programme did not soon produce tangible evidence of success. The
war in Europe might soon be concluded, when the full weight of Allied power
would be shifted to the Pacific with an invasion of the Japanese home islands.
If the B-29s were to make this unnecessary by bombing Japan into submission,
there was need of immediate improvement.
