Supplies
dropped by parachute. Supplies are parachuted from a Douglas C-47 of the Tenth
US Army Air Force on the 10 December 1944. The C-47 was the workhorse of Allied
air transport, and the war in Burma could scarcely have been won without it.
The year 1944 witnessed a major change of
fortune in Burma. In March, the Japanese launched a major offensive designed to
take them into India. It was repulsed after bitter fighting and the British
14th Army began a counter-offensive that would prove decisive.
Lord Louis Mountbatten became supreme
Allied commander of the Southeast Asia Command in October 1943. He brought
fresh purpose, while the British 14th Army, under General Bill Slim, had been
undergoing rigorous training in jungle warfare. Mountbatten wanted to use
amphibious operations to weaken the Japanese hold on Burma, but the priority of
shipping lay with Europe and the Pacific, and there was virtually none to spare
for Burma. Even so, the British had begun to advance again into the Arakan,
Burma’s coastal region. Also, in north Burma, General Joseph Stilwell and his Chinese
troops had begun their advance from Ledo, building a road as they went, to link
up with the old Burma Road at Lashio. Mountbatten therefore agreed to mount a
second Chindit expedition to tie down Japanese forces in the north and thus
assist Stilwell’s advance.
Japan
on the offensive
The Japanese also had plans. They were to
attempt an invasion of India in the expectation that the Indians themselves
would then rise against their colonial master. The main attack would be made in
central Burma, but they would also mount a diversionary attack in the Arakan.
This opened on February 6, 1944. However, instead of withdrawing as in the
past, the British stood their ground and fought. Some elements were surrounded
and were resupplied by air until they could be relieved and, after three weeks,
the Japanese forces halted their attacks.
In the meantime, the first Chindit brigade
had set off on foot and two more were flown into rough landing strips behind
the Japanese lines in early March. The main Japanese offensive opened on the
night of March 7/8. General Bill Slim had expected an attack, but not so early.
His forces withdrew toward his main forward supply base at Imphal. Here, they
resisted a succession of Japanese attacks. North of Imphal a crucial battle now
developed at Kohima, the small hill village that guarded the road to Dinapur,
the main railhead for supplies. The fighting, much of which was at close
quarters, continued for two weeks until the British garrison could be relieved.
The battle then continued, with the British gradually forcing the Japanese
back. Meanwhile, the Chindits had been advancing north to link up with
Stilwell, fighting some fierce actions as they did so.
Stilwell, too, was making good progress
and, on May 11, Merrill’s Marauders, the US Chindit equivalent, took Myitkyina
airfield, although the Japanese in the town proved too strong for them.
Simultaneously, forces from China began to advance down the old Burma Road.
Mogaung was captured by the Chindits at the end of June, but having spent
months behind Japanese lines, the men were by now at their last gasp.
Japan on the defensive
The Japanese were also exhausted and had
virtually run out of supplies. Hence, on July 11, they called off their
offensive and began to withdraw, with Slim’s men following, to the Chindwin
River. Three weeks later Stilwell finally secured Myitkyina, but by then the
monsoon season had arrived, calling a halt to operations. Now forced onto the
defensive, the Japanese drew up fresh plans. In the north they intended to
prevent the link-up of the Ledo Road with the original Burma Road. In the
center they planned to hold the British 14th Army on the Irrawaddy River, as
well as stemming any advance west of the Irrawaddy to Rangoon.
While the advances in northern Burma
continued, Slim began his offensive in early December with crossings of the
Chindwin. Desperately short of supplies the Japanese were unwilling to give
battle forward on their main defensive position on the Irrawaddy. Slim’s plan
was to trap the Japanese in the loop of the Irrawaddy based on Meiktila. Given
the lack of Japanese resistance between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy, however, he
amended it. Now his intention was to make the Japanese believe that his next
objective was Mandalay, when in fact it was Meiktila, a key communications center,
which would also give him the ability to dash southwards to the ports of
Rangoon or Moulmein. While this was happening, the advance down the Arakan
continued, accompanied in January 1945 by a number of small amphibious
operations designed to outflank the Japanese.
Building
the Ledo Road. A triumph of engineering, the Ledo Road ran 465 miles (750 km)
from Ledo to the old Burma Road. It took two years to construct, through some
of the country’s most inhospitable terrain.
Burma
liberated
In mid-January Slim’s troops established
bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, and Japanese forces spent
the rest of the month trying to destroy them, but without success. Meanwhile,
in northern Burma a momentous event had occurred. On January 27 the forces
advancing along the Ledo Road, under the command of General Stilwell, linked up
with the Chinese troops that were advancing south, down the old Burma Road.
Apart from mopping-up operations, the north of the country had now been
liberated. Mid-February saw Slim’s troops cross the Irrawaddy opposite
Meiktila. The latter fell at the start of March, the Japanese having been
convinced that Mandalay was the main objective, as Slim had hoped. Realizing
their mistake, Japan launched a series of counterattacks against the town. The
battle for Mandalay was taking place at the same time. The Japanese resistance
was bitter, but finally, on March 20, Fort Dufferin, the last bastion in the
town, fell. A week later the Japanese ceased their attacks on Meiktila and
began to withdraw. Slim’s sights were now set on Rangoon, some 300 miles (480
km) to the south.
The advance to Rangoon began on March 30.
It followed the line of the Sittang River, brushing aside any Japanese
opposition. The main concern was the approaching monsoon season. The Mango
Rains, which preceded the monsoons, did arrive on April 20, but Slim’s men
remained undeterred.
To ensure that Rangoon was quickly seized,
paratroops dropped at the mouth of its estuary on May 1, and Indian troops made
an amphibious landing the next day. They entered the Burmese capital on May 3,
a day after the Japanese had evacuated. Three days later, these forces joined
up with the troops advancing down the Sittang.
Japan’s
predicament
The remnants of Japan’s forces were now in
two groups. Those east of the Sittang had withdrawn to the Shan Hills on the
border with Thailand, while what remained of the Twenty-Eighth Army was trapped
west of the Sittang. Neither group was fit enough to withdraw to Malaya.
