In a rapid advance, the Imperial Japanese
Army overran British positions in northern Malaya, easily breaking through at
Jitra, a strongly fortified line of wire entanglements and deep trenches
astride the road to Alor Star. It was expected to be held for three months. An
impromptu night attack by barely 500 Japanese soldiers drove off the defenders
in a matter of hours. Along with 3,000 prisoners came large stores of
ammunition, petrol and food. For the rest of the campaign, these frequent bags
of supplies were laughingly called “Churchill’s allowance”. To turn British
positions, baffling tactics were employed, such as night attacks, encirclement,
sudden charges and small boat operations. To maintain the momentum of the
advance, Yamashita Tomoyuki ’ s men rode bicycles. Tsuji Masanobu recalls how
the
greatest difficulty . . . was the excessive heat, owing to which the tyres
punctured easily. A bicycle repair squad of at least two men was attached to
each company, and each squad repaired an average of twenty machines a day. But
such repairs were only makeshift. When the enemy was being hotly pursued, and
time was pressing, punctured tyres were taken off and bicycles ridden on the
rims. Surprisingly enough they ran smoothly on the paved roads, which were in
perfect condition. Numbers of bicycles some with tyres and some without, when
passing along a road, made a noise resembling a tank. At night when such
bicycle units advanced the enemy frequently retreated hurriedly, saying, “Here
come the tanks! ” . . . Thanks to Britain’s dear money spent on excellent
roads, and to the cheap Japanese bicycles, the assault on Malaya was easy.
And when necessary, the Japanese abandoned
pedals and advanced through the jungle, carrying their bicycles on their
shoulders. This the British found as disconcerting as attacks from the rear.
It was in fact the jungle that Yamashita
Tomoyuki so brilliantly exploited. He realised the potential for outflanking
movements when he saw it for the first time near Saigon. His previous posting
had been Manzhouguo. Unlike him however, nearly all British senior officers
regarded jungle and swampy ground as impenetrable natural obstacles. The
shining exception was Ian Stewart, the commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Having investigated the problems of fighting
under tropical conditions, he took his men on training exercises designed to
accustom them to both the advantages and disadvantages of military action in
primary as well as secondary jungle. In the process, the Argylls banished any
fears they had about plants or animals. “Cross - country movement through the jungle,
” Stewart wrote, “ and living in it for days at a time, not only by large
parties but by small groups of three or four officers or NCOs, was practised
until the jungle became a friend and not an enemy. ”
This familiarity saved the Argylls from
destruction on several occasions: it also helped inflict an early reverse on
the apparently unbeatable Imperial Japanese Army at Grik Road, inland from Penang.
There the Japanese were shocked by a counterattack delivered from the jungle on
each side of this thoroughfare. As Steward commented:
One
of the arts of rearguard tactics in the jungle is time and space calculation .
. . Quite genuinely it is a fascinating game, embodying as it does
appreciations of ground, enemy dispositions, and above all the mind and speed
of action of the opposing commander. But it is a nervy business, for a
commander works with the jungle as a bandage over his eyes; there is no warning
of an approaching crisis, and the situation will turn from blue sky to black
storm in a minute or two. There are two rules that must never be broken: to
hang on desperately to the initiative and to have plans ready and understood by
all in anticipation of every eventuality.
Because the British had neither tanks nor
an adequate antitank defence, Stewart ’ s use of the jungle alongside roads was
critical in the battles which were fought to slow down the Japanese advance.
At the engagement for the bridge at the
River Slim in early January 1942, a disastrous British defeat that sealed the
fate of Kuala Lumpur, the Argylls improvised road blocks and threw Molotov
cocktails at Japanese medium tanks. While the bottle - bombs proved less
effective than those used by the Imperial Japanese Army at Nomonhan, there was
no shortage of volunteers for the Molotov cocktail party. Through this
encounter the Japanese came to respect the courage of Stewart’s men, who alone
on the surrender of Singapore rode to the Changi prisoner - of - war camp.
Impressed by their refusal to hand over their transport, Japanese sentries
saluted the column as it went into captivity to the sound of bagpipes. Those
Argylls who were sent to work in other parts of the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere often found their distinctive bonnets attracted the
attention of Japanese officers. In Thailand a sergeant - major was informed
that “Argyll Scotsmen number one fighters ”.
Not that the Argylls ’ well - deserved
reputation for jungle warfare did much to save Malaya or Singapore. Their
capture was a foregone conclusion when British military doctrine firmly held
that the jungle was impassable for large numbers of troops and that the
situation was therefore overwhelmingly in favour of the defenders. It was on
this assumption that the so - called fortress at Singapore had been built. Only
a threat from the sea was ever seriously considered before the outbreak of the
Pacific War. By the time Arthur Percival appreciated what was happening in
Malaya, it was too late to adjust to Japanese methods of attack. Percival
ordered the adoption of guerrilla tactics. Formations should reduce their
transport as far as possible by sending all vehicles that were not immediately
wanted well to the rear.
But as Stewart later commented: “New
tactics cannot be learnt in the middle of a battle.” Another reason for
Yamashita Tomoyuki ’ s victory was far better intelligence: he even knew the
names of all the Argyll officers. The sheer speed of the Japanese advance gave
the British commander - in - chief no chance of regrouping his forces for a
last stand in southern Malaya, so that in February 1942 Percival was called
upon to conduct his last campaign, the defence of Singapore.
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