The conjoint battles of Mandalay and
Meiktila raged through March. The 19th Division broke out of its bridgeheads,
fought down the east bank of the Irrawaddy, and entered Mandalay on March 9.
The Japanese resisted strongly. Mandalay Hill, 780 feet above the surrounding
country, was taken in two days, but the massive walls of Fort Dufferin were
impenetrable to ordinary missiles. Finally a breach was made with 2000-pound
bombs, and on March 20 the enemy fled.
The rest of the XXXIIId Corps meanwhile
fought on to Meiktila. They met great opposition, as the Japanese
Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the intervention of the 17th Division behind
his front, showed no signs as yet of withdrawing, and the armies were well
matched. General Slim had six divisions and two armoured brigades, against over
eight, under-strength, Japanese divisions and a division of the “Indian
National Army.” But at the end of the month the enemy gave up the struggle and
began to fall back down the main road to Toungoo and Rangoon, and through the
mountains to the east. After many weeks of battle our supplies were badly
strained, but the enemy’s must have been much worse. Long-sustained attacks by
the Strategical Air Force on communications and rear installations and constant
harrying of their retiring troops by the tactical air forces produced a crisis
in their affairs.
There was also a crisis in our own affairs.
The battles had lasted much longer than we expected. General Sultan was now
halted on the Lashio road, and the advent of two Japanese divisions which had
opposed him aggravated the delay. There was now no prospect of the Fourteenth
Army reaching Rangoon by mid-April, and it was very doubtful if they could get
there before the monsoon. Mountbatten accordingly decided to make an amphibious
assault on the town after all. This would have to be much smaller than had been
anticipated, and the attack on Puket Island would have to be cancelled. Even so
the attack could not be launched before the first week in May, and by then it
might be too late.
General Slim meanwhile resolved that the
IVth Corps should pursue the enemy down the road and railway, while the XXXIIId
Corps worked their way down the Irrawaddy. He was determined not only to reach
Rangoon, but to draw a double net down Southern Burma and trap the enemy within
it. The 7th and 20th Divisions accordingly drove down the river with
overlapping thrusts and reached Prome on May 2. After a stiff fight with the
remnants of three Japanese divisions at Pyawbe the advance went even more
swiftly along the road and the railway. The troops were on half-rations to
enable them to carry more petrol. An armoured column, and the mechanised
brigades of the 5th and 17th Divisions, leapfrogging over each other, reached
Toungoo on April 22. The airfields here were badly needed to further the air supply
on which all depended, and also to bring the fighters of 221 Group R.A.F.
within range of Rangoon. The next bound was to Pegu, whose capture would close
the enemy’s southernmost escape route from Lower Burma. Our advanced troops
reached it on April 29.
That afternoon torrential rain fell,
heralding an early monsoon. Forward air-strips were out of action; tanks and
vehicles could not move off the roads. The Japanese mustered every possible man
to hold the town and the bridges over the river. On May 2 the 17th Division
finally broke through, and, hoping to be first in Rangoon, prepared themselves
to advance the few remaining miles.
But May 2 was also the D-Day of the
amphibious assault. For two days beforehand Allied heavy bombers attacked the
defences at Elephant Point, which barred the entrance to Rangoon River. On May
1 a parachute battalion dropped on the defenders and the channel was opened for
minesweeping. Next day ships of the 26th Division, supported by 224 Group
R.A.F., reached the river-mouth. A Mosquito aircraft flew over Rangoon and saw
no signs of the enemy. The crew landed at a near-by airfield, walked into the
city, and were greeted by a number of our prisoners of war. In the belief that
an amphibious attack was no longer likely, the Japanese garrison had departed
some days before to hold Pegu. That afternoon the monsoon broke in all its
violence, and Rangoon fell with only a few hours to spare.
This amphibious force soon joined the 17th
Division at Pegu and the 20th Division at Prome. Many thousands of Japanese
were trapped, and during the next three months great numbers perished in
attempts to escape eastward.
Thus ended the long struggle in Burma, but
a tribute is due to those other Services without whose aid the struggles of the
Army would have availed little. The Royal Navy had achieved undisputed command
of the sea. They could, and did, convey the Army in safety wherever it was
needed. The Allied Air Forces had utterly vanquished the Japanese planes, and
their support had been unfailing. Airborne supply had been developed and
maintained on a prodigious scale. Under General Snelling, the chief
administrative officer of the Fourteenth Army, the supply services worked
admirably. Last, but not least, the Engineers, both British and American,
wrought many wonders of improvisation and achievement, such as laying nearly
3000 miles of pipe-line across river, forest, and mountain. The famous
Fourteenth Army, under the masterly command of General Slim, fought valiantly,
overcame all obstacles, and achieved the seemingly impossible. On May 9 I
telegraphed to the Supreme Commander:
Prime
Minister to Admiral Mountbatten (Southeast Asia) 9 May 45
I
send you my most heartfelt congratulations upon the culminating victory at
Rangoon of your Burma campaigns. The hard fighting at Imphal and Kohima in 1944
prepared the way for the brilliant operations, conducted over a vast range of
territory, which have crowned the exertions of the Southeast Asia Command in
1945. When these matters were considered at Quebec last September it was
thought both by your High Command and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff,
reporting to the President and me, that about six British and British-Indian
divisions, together with much shipping and landing vessels, all of which, and
more, were asked for by you, would be required for enterprises less
far-reaching than those you and your gallant forces and Allies have in fact
accomplished. The prolongation of the German war made it impossible to send the
British and British-Indian divisions which you needed, and a good many other
units on which you were counting had to be retained in the decisive European
theatre. In spite of this diminution and disappointment you and your men have
done all and more than your directive required. Pray convey to everyone under
your command or associated with you the sense of admiration and gratitude felt
by all at home at the splendid close of the Burma campaign.
In
honour of these great deeds of Southeast Asia Command His Majesty the King has
commanded that a special decoration, the “Burma Star,” should be struck, and
the ribbons will be flown out to you at the earliest moment.
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